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Abstract 
This paper describes how behavioral biases influence the resolution of financial covenant violations. 
Prior literature documents that violation waivers are common; however, there is a lack of discussion on 
the determinants that lead loan officers to waive covenant violations. We rely on the escalation of 
commitment bias (or the sunk cost phenomenon) to discuss how loan officers may become attached to 
a selected course of action and fail to incorporate new information, increasing the likelihood of covenant 
waivers. We explain the implications of this bias on bank financial reports by detailing how accounting 
links loan quality to bank financial statements. We further draw on the psychology literature to offer 
potential solutions to mitigate overcommitment in the context of loan officers. Future research can 
examine the extent to which loan officers knowingly or unknowingly steer away from rational decision-
making. This study has practical implications as users of bank financial reports, including investors, 
auditors, examiners, and bank managers, learn about processes and challenges on how accounting 
mechanics link bank loan portfolios to financial statements. 
Keywords: Behavioral biases; Escalation of commitment; Financial covenant violations; Covenant 
waivers 
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The use of financial covenants in commercial loans is widespread. Loan officers rely on financial covenants, 
which take the shape of financial ratios, to restrict borrower behavior, and it is common for borrowers to 
violate covenants (e.g., Dichev and Skinner, 2002). This breach of contract requires the lender to make 
sequential judgments regarding the severity of the violation and decide on a course of action, ranging from 
waiving the covenant violation to recalling the loan. However, the lender often issues covenant waivers and 
does not change the loan structure (Chodorow-Reich and Falato, 2020). While the literature on loan contracts 
shows that lenders commonly waive financial covenant violations, there is little discussion on the 
determinants that drive the lender to this decision and the implications of waiving covenant violations. The 
purpose of this paper is to introduce a behavioral bias that influences the resolution of covenant violations 
and discuss the impact of misinterpreting violations on credit risk management and banks' financial 
statements.  
 
Assessing the severity of a financial covenant violation is not an easy task. Loan officers write covenants 
based on the borrower's information at the time of loan origination. However, borrower and market conditions 
may change over time. Further, the borrower may be subject to one-time adverse events that trigger a 
violation but are unlikely to recur. Therefore, covenant violations can fall anywhere in the spectrum of credit 
risk, ranging from an insignificant to a material increase in credit risk.  
 
While the loan officer relies on facts to decide on a course of action, behavioral biases may cloud the risk 
assessment. Biases can influence any judgment, including the resolution of financial covenants. Some biases 
tend to occur when decision-makers commit to a course of action. Despite learning subsequent contradictory 
evidence, individuals make choices that support the initial course of action. This type of bias is known as 
"escalation of commitment" or "sunk cost phenomenon" (Staw, 1981).  
 
Studies have shown escalation of commitment in different business contexts. For example, loan officers who 
originated a loan to a borrower are more likely to continue lending funds to the same borrower even if their 
performance suggests otherwise. In contrast, lenders who did not make the first loan but rely on the same 
information are less likely to lend to that borrower (Ruchala et al., 1996). Similarly, auditors who make an 
initial evaluation of a loan and subsequently learn information about a borrower's deteriorating performance 
tend to stick to their initial assessment and therefore rate the borrower more favorably. However, auditors 
exposed to the same information but did not make an initial evaluation are more likely to incorporate that 
contradictory evidence in subsequent judgment (Jeffrey, 1992).  
 
In the context of financial covenants, escalation of commitment can influence how loan officers resolve 
violations. A loan officer approves a loan (or recommends the loan for approval to a credit committee) based 
on the borrower's information at loan origination. Based on that initial assessment and loan structure, the 
loan officer concludes the default risk is low. However, after that initial decision, the escalation of commitment 
bias can influence future loan decisions. One potential place where this bias can occur is in the resolution of 
financial covenant violations. When these occur, the loan officer must decide and document whether there 
is a material increase in credit risk. This assessment is not always clear-cut, and therefore loan officers can 
be influenced by their prior decision. The loan officer's decision may be unconscious since the lender 
unknowingly continues supporting a failing course of action. However, this bias can also be conscious since 
the lender may continue supporting an initial course of action to protect his image, support personal 
connections with the borrower, benefit from potential job opportunities, or gain other financial interest (Berger 
and Udell, 2002). The overcommitment bias, whether conscious or unconscious, influences how the loan 
officer resolves the violation. 
 
If the loan officer concludes that the breach does not indicate a material increase in credit risk, there is no 
need to penalize the borrower. Therefore, the loan officer waives the violation and does not act against the 
borrower, such as imposing new loan conditions, renegotiating to stricter terms, or accelerating maturity, 
among other options. Similarly, concluding that the covenant violation does not capture an increase in credit 
risk often results in the loan officer's redefining the financial covenants to avoid the borrower triggering the 
same covenants in similar events. However, suppose the loan officer's assessment of the severity of the 
violation is incorrect, and the financial covenant breach represents an increase in credit risk. In that case, the 
bank is not acting against an increase in borrower default risk and is not adjusting the accounting numbers 
on the bank financial statements to represent the true economics of the bank loan portfolio. 
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Behavioral biases can negatively impact long-term bank performance and affect the reliability of bank 
financial statements. Covenant violations allow the lender to step in and protect from potential losses. 
However, waiving covenant violations and not taking action expose banks to higher credit risk. Further, not 
recognizing increases in credit risk on a timely basis impacts bank financial statements' usefulness. Omitting 
loan problems decreases bank financial statements' reliability as loan reserves do not reflect the 
corresponding risk, and the loan portfolio overstates bank assets.  
 
The literature on financial covenants primarily addresses the financial aspects of the determinants and 
consequences of financial covenants relying on economic theories. For instance, extant research examines 
how lenders design financial covenants (e.g., Christensen et al., 2016; Demerjian and Owens, 2016; Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002), the impact of violations on the borrower (e.g., Demiroglu and James, 2010; Freudenberg 
et al., 2017; Saunders et al., 2012), and how bank characteristics affect loan contract outcomes (Acharya et 
al. (2020); Wang and Xia, 2014; Chodorow-Reich and Falato, 2017). However, we know less about the non-
financial factors and behavioral biases that affect decision-making pertaining to financial covenants. Our 
study focuses on a common type of bias known as "escalation of commitment" (also known as "sunk cost 
phenomenon" or "throwing good money after bad") and how this bias affects the assessment of covenant 
violations and their resolution. This study explains why violations are frequent, but the lender less frequently 
enforces penalties. In doing so, this study also contributes to the literature on relationship lending that seeks 
to explain how bank-borrower relationships work, including how banks acquire borrower information and how 
lenders process borrower information (Berger and Udell, 1998; 2002). 
 
We contribute to the literature by describing the accounting process that links loan quality to banks' financial 
statements. We apply and discuss the behavioral biases that can arise in this process, affecting the mapping 
of the true economics of the loan portfolio to bank financial reports. In particular, we explain which accounts 
are misstated on the bank financial statements. We further draw on the psychology literature to offer solutions 
in the lending setting to mitigate overcommitment. Due to the potential for hidden credit risk and impaired 
reliability of bank financial statements, this paper is of interest to credit administrators, auditors, examiners, 
and users of bank financial information. 
 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. The following section reviews the literature and presents a 
theoretical background, detailing how covenant violations map into bank financial reports and how behavioral 
biases may impair this process. The discussions and summary section describes techniques that lenders 
can rely on to reduce biases in resolving covenant violations. The last section concludes and provides 





Commercial loans typically have financial covenants, which require the borrower to comply with thresholds 
such as interest coverage ratios (e.g., EBITDA/Interest) and liquidity ratios (Demiroglu and James, 2010). 
Consistent with agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, covenants reduce agency costs and 
allocate control rights (Christensen et al., 2016). According to agency theory, financial covenants limit actions 
that expropriate wealth from lenders. For example, net-worth-based financial covenants restrict dividend 
payouts, balance-sheet covenants restrict additional debt issuance, and profitability-based covenants limit 
the borrower's riskiness. According to incomplete contracting theory, covenants are also set to allocate 
control to the party with incentives to maximize value. Since the borrower and lender cannot anticipate all 
future outcomes, the contracting parties use covenants to assign control rights. When the borrower violates 
covenants, the lender takes control and can choose from a menu of options. 
 
Consistent with the idea of restricting borrower's activities and allocating control rights, covenants are set 
tightly. Lenders impose financial covenants based on borrower fundamentals and lender attributes (e.g., 
Demerjian and Owens, 2016). The distance between the required and actual ratios (known as covenant 
slack) is narrow to allow the lender to restrict borrower activities and step in to take control. Further, financial 
covenants are measured for compliance frequently, typically every quarter for the loan duration. Since 
covenants are set tightly and measured often, it is not uncommon for the borrower to trigger a covenant and 
provide the lender with an early warning of an increase in credit risk (Dichev and Skinner, 2002).  
 
When a covenant violation occurs, the lender can choose from different options. The lender waives the 
violations when she concludes that the increase in credit risk is immaterial. The loan officer's most drastic 
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decision is the loan agreement's termination, which requires the borrower to immediately pay off the loan (or 
find a new lender who will pay off the initial lender). However, the lender rarely exercises this option. Several 
other options fall in between the waiver and termination. The lender can increase interest rates, demand 
additional collateral, decrease the lending commitment, demand a partial payment, and shorten the loan's 
maturity. 
 
Prior literature shows that covenant violations have implications on the contracting parties. Negative 
experiences with borrowers affect how lenders underwrite subsequent loans. Banks respond to increased 
credit market risk by changing the nature of the covenants themselves (Christensen et al., 2021). During a 
financial shock, loan officers will impose more strict performance-based covenants surrounding profitability 
and firm efficiency. Doing so allows banks concerned about their screening abilities to monitor borrowers for 
any warning indicating a deterioration in credit quality. Capital covenants which are based on balance sheet 
items and focus on debt and capital structure were likewise reduced to allow greater flexibility for the borrower 
(Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012).  
 
Covenant violations also have implications for the borrower. Not only does the borrower suffer more stringent 
repayment terms following a violation, but higher interest rates on new loans and additional financial 
covenants (Freudenberg et al., 2017). Borrowers who switch banks following a covenant violation received 
higher interest rates and were likely to violate future covenants (Saunders et al., 2012). Due to the critical 
consequences of covenant violations on both lenders and borrowers, the loan officer plays an important role 
when deciding to waive a violation. 
 
The nature of loan covenants themselves is also an important indicator of loan viability. Many loan officers 
impose covenants when there is substantial uncertainty around the borrower's financial condition (Demerjian, 
2010). On the other hand, even with a single covenant violation, the borrower faces both an increase in loan 
spread and a higher default risk three months after the violation (Saunders et al., 2012). Clever loan officers 
can tailor covenants to optimize the performance of the borrowing firm. Covenants derived from income 
statement ratios are positively correlated to borrower performance, while those derived from balance sheet 
ratios are negatively correlated (Demerjian, 2010).  
 
Covenant violations enable a bank to renegotiate their contracts with the borrower, including a restricted line 
of credit availability, higher interest rates, and even termination of the loan contract. However, lenders most 
often choose to either waive the violation or renegotiate the loan terms.  Prior research shows that assessing 
the severity of the covenant violation is based upon the borrower's financial condition. Still, lenders also 
consider loan features, regulatory environment, and overall liquidity risk the bank presents, among others 
(HassabElnaby, 2006). 
 
By imposing covenants, lenders utilize both the financial credibility of the firm and the private information the 
loan officer holds regarding borrower reliability. Thus, the information content of the loan covenants also 
matters. Demiroglu and James (2010) find that violations of tighter debt covenants were substantially less 
impactful on borrower investment activity than breaches of 'loosely set' covenants. Tighter covenants, where 
the bank imposes financial covenant restrictions with little 'slack' around current values, are violated more 
often but have less of a negative effect on the borrower. By extension, the expectation that the borrower's 
financial position would improve encourages lenders to provide both tighter covenants but less severe 
consequences for borrowers who violated them.  
 
Banks participating in securitized lending markets were more likely to create looser covenants and invest 
less in monitoring these loans after origination (Wang and Xia, 2014). Active monitoring is crucial for not only 
recognizing covenant violations but obtaining waivers. Firms already being actively monitored were more 
likely to get waivers for covenant violations (Gustafson et al., 2020), indicating that loan officers' opinions on 
the severity of the covenant violation are related to borrower transparency.  
 
Loan officers are also more severe with borrowers whose covenant violations pressure the bank's current 
liquidity position. During the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market (ABCP) that began in 
late 2007, Acharya et al. (2020) found that banks with high ABCP exposure imposed more severe covenant 
restrictions on lines of credit in firms. Lenders in poor financial health are more likely to punitively reduce loan 
commitments to borrowers (Chodorow-Reich and Falato, 2017). Banking institutions in better fiscal health 
were also more likely to be magnanimous and offer waivers to covenant violators. Banks exposed to financial 
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crises are also more likely to be more severe with borrowers' covenant violations (Ao et al., 2019), resulting 
in a greater likelihood of borrower distress.  
 
While prior literature describes the probability of issuing a covenant waiver in terms of both the bank's 
financial health and the prevailing macroeconomic conditions, we know little about the behavioral biases that 
affect this decision. Next, we describe how covenant violations map into bank financial reports to understand 





How do covenant violations and waivers affect banks' financial reports? Figure (1) shows how accounting 
mechanics link violations to bank financial reports.  
 
 
Figure 1: Model 1- The accounting process associated with covenant violations 
 
Banks maintain complex internal rating processes to gauge borrowers' credit quality (Li and McMahan, 2015). 
In these systems, the borrower is graded, and covenants are imposed depending on the loan's risks at loan 
origination. When a financial covenant violation takes place, the loan officer assesses the severity of the 
violation. The loan officer interacts directly with the clients and is the first bank employee to learn about loan 
problems. The loan officer analyzes the borrower's financial statements, measures the covenants for 
compliance, and requests other information explaining the borrower's performance. While the loan officer 
relies on hard information, which is characterized by numbers (e.g., financial statements, tax returns), the 
loan officer gains a lot of soft information from the borrower (e.g., opinions, plans, market commentary) 
(Liberti and Petersen, 2019). Hard and soft information create a context in which to evaluate the severity of 
the covenant violation. However, the loan officer may depart (knowingly or unknowingly) from rational 
decision-making by weighing information differently and using soft information to qualify the hard information 
to support his/her initial course of action.  
  
To resolve the violation, the loan officer chooses from several available options. If the lender concludes the 
increase in credit risk is minimal, the lender issues a waiver. Waiving the violation and concluding there is no 
increase in credit risk implies that no further accounting treatment is required. This option occurs frequently, 
and the borrower may incur fees. If the lender also concludes that the violation captures immaterial increases 
in credit risk, he may redefine the financial covenants. The lender can loosen financial covenants by 
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increasing covenant slack (i.e., the distance between the required and actual ratios) or redefining the 
covenant to include/exclude other items. The waiver is the least costly to the borrower.  
 
However, the lender may conclude an increase in credit risk and internally downgrades the loan. The 
downgrade leads to an increase in loan loss reserves, as shown in Figure (1). From an accounting 
perspective, credit quality deterioration includes a credit to the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) 
and a debit to an expense account called provision for loan and lease losses. The ALLL is a contra-asset 
account that reduces the amount of total loan receivable and reflects the loan portfolio risk. Further, credit 
loss recognition decreases bank profitability and Tier 1 capital (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Therefore, the 
recognition of asset quality deterioration leads to lower total loans (i.e., lower total assets), higher credit 
losses, and lower capital levels.  
 
This process shows that misinterpreting the severity of the violation and issuing a waiver when the violation 
indicates an increase in credit risk has important implications in the quality of bank financial statements since 
bank reports do not reflect the true economics of the loan portfolio. Failing to recognize an increase in credit 
risk (whether small or material) understates the loan loss reserve and overstates regulatory capital. 
 
The potential for biases in rating loans is likely to happen with commercial loans because of accounting rules 
and the accumulation of 'soft' information by the loan officer. In contrast, other loans are less likely to suffer 
from loan officer biases. For example, small commercial loans, credit card loans, installment loans, and 
consumer loans are assigned internal risk grades based on automated rules that depend on historical 
statistics, credit scores, payment history, and other risk indicators. Small loans follow rigid rules, which 
prevent, to some extent, loan officer biases. In contrast, evaluating large loans on an individual basis may 
allow for biases to exist when interpreting the severity of covenant violations.  
 
Once the loan officer concludes what the resolution should be, he may have to seek approval from his 
supervisors and credit administrators. The extent of how much power the loan officer has depends on the 
bank's internal policies. Since commercial loans tend to be large (relative to consumer loans), loan officers 
commonly request supervisors' and credit administrators' approval. While other bank employers may 
influence the resolution of violations, they rely on the loan officer's information. If biases are present, whether 
conscious or unconscious, the same inputs can affect third parties' decision-making.  
  
Figure (1) clearly shows that the loan officer is important in mapping loan quality into bank financial reports. 
However, the loan officer may steer away from rational decision-making. We now develop in detail how 
behavioral biases may cloud the risk assessment, increasing the likelihood of issuing a covenant waiver and 
affecting the mechanics described in Figure (1).  
 
Escalation of commitment takes place in sequential decision-making. It refers to the tendency to provide 
judgment consistent with prior assessments, therefore escalating commitment to a chosen action course 
(Staw, 1981). The problem arises when the individual fails to incorporate new information that updates his or 
her beliefs. While contradictory evidence suggests otherwise, the decision-maker supports the initial decision 
and continues providing resources to a potentially unprofitable course of action to justify prior choices. The 
decision-maker that falls prey to this bias can make an initial decision consistent with a rational decision-
maker. That is, the decision-maker can make the "right" decision based on the initial information. However, 
biases can affect how the individual interprets newly arrived information, suggesting a different course of 
action.    
 
This bias occurs due to the motivation to justify past decisions. Individuals need to demonstrate competence 
by showing that their earlier decision was correct, ultimately protecting their image. Therefore, individuals 
depart from rational decision-making by weighing information differently to maintain the initially selected 
course of action. This escalation tendency has been shown in the banking industry and loan-related 
decisions. For example, loan officers who approved a loan are more likely to support a second loan to the 
same borrower even if borrower conditions deteriorated. In contrast, loan officers who did not make the initial 
loan are less likely to make the second loan given the same borrower conditions (Ruchala et al. 1996). 
Further work shows that professional auditors evaluating loan portfolios are also subject to the escalation of 
commitment (Jeffrey, 1992). We extend prior work on the escalation of commitment in the banking industry 
by discussing how this behavioral bias affects the resolution of financial covenant violations.  
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The conditions necessary for escalation of commitment to occur are (1) a series of decisions, (2) negative 
feedback about a previous decision, and (3) the choice to continue (Brockner, 1992). The setting of financial 
covenant violations presents these three conditions allowing for this bias to influence decision-making. First, 
there is a series of decisions. The loan officer makes an initial assessment of the borrower. Then, the 
borrower can trigger a financial covenant requiring the loan officer to reassess the loan. This means that 
commercial lending is not always an isolated decision concerning each commercial loan. Instead, the loan 
officer faces a series of decisions. Second, the loan officer learns negative information about his initial 
decision. Covenant violations mean that the borrower fails to comply with their covenants, indicating an 
increase in credit risk. Last, the loan officer has the choice to continue with his chosen course of action. The 
loan officer can waive the violations and continue with the loan or can modify the loan terms. Clearly, this 
setting has the conditions necessary for the commitment bias to occur.  
 
Falling prey to this bias has negative consequences because it affects banks' exposures to risk and reduces 
bank financial statements' reliability. Covenant violations mean a potential increase in credit risk and allow 
the lender to protect from such an increase in risk. The loan officer can charge fees, increase interest rates, 
demand a partial principal payment, require additional collateral, reduce maturity, and even the drastic 
decision to order payoff. However, the loan officer does not always take action to protect from increases in 
credit risk. Instead, the loan officer often waives the violation postponing the decision to take action in hopes 
that the borrower's situation will improve.  
 
Failing to recognize the increase in credit risk affects the reliability of financial statements. Banks maintain 
loan rating systems to allocate reserves (Treacy and Carey, 2000). If the loan officer does not downgrade 
the loan on a timely basis, the bank will not increase its loan reserves. From an accounting perspective, the 
bank does not recognize an increase in the provision for loan losses (an expense account that reduces 
capital ratios). It does not increase the allowance for loan losses (a contra-asset account that decreases total 
loans). Therefore, the bank is understating its loan loss reserves and overstating assets and capital levels.  
 
Whether the loan officer is prone to this bias affects bank exposure to credit risk and financial statements' 
reliability. Therefore, this issue and potential solutions are of interest to the loan officer, the entire banking 
organization, and financial information users. In the next section, we discuss solutions to reduce the 
escalation of commitment bias. 
 
 
Discussions and Summary 
 
This study thus far describes the critical role that the loan officer plays in ensuring that the true economics of 
the loan portfolio map into the bank financial reports. An incorrect assessment affects whether the loan is 
downgraded and whether the bank reflects the overall credit risk on its financial statements. To mitigate this 
important problem, we draw on the psychology literature to reduce commitment bias. We discuss these 
practices and whether they apply to the commercial lending setting. In particular, we discuss (1) seeking the 
advice of outsiders, (2) justifying the course of action, (3) monitoring, (4) compensation incentives, and (5) 
rotating the decision-maker. 
  
Seeking advice from an outsider mitigates overcommitment bias (Staw, 1981). The idea is to seek external 
feedback from an independent third party who was not involved in the initial decision. A third party who was 
not involved in the initial decision lacks the condition of repeated decision making, which is required for 
escalation of commitment to occur (Brockner, 1992). Further, the third party is not responsible for the initial 
decision and does have incentives to justify past actions and protect her image. Therefore, we suggest that 
the loan officer in charge of the loan consults with another lender who was not involved in the initial decision 
making. Further, since studies suggest that experienced decision-makers consider more inputs in their 
judgments and therefore are less likely to overcommit (e.g., Jeffrey, 1992; Rodgers, 1999), we recommend 
that the independent third party be an experienced decision-maker in the lending area. 
  
A second potential solution to avoid escalation is to justify the course of action. Loan officers can document 
their workout decision by describing the rationale for their choice and sources of information to arrive at that 
conclusion. Doing so makes the loan officer more aware of whether the decision is based on soft or hard 
financial information and therefore wary of whether she is subject to behavioral biases. For example, users 
of financial information de-escalate when instructed to comprehensively evaluate a company's condition and 
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performance (Brody and Kaplan, 1999). Requiring the officer to consider different sources fosters thorough 
decision-making, de-escalating commitment. 
  
Monitoring attenuates undesirable overcommitment (Kirby and Davis, 1998; McNamara et al., 2002; 
Kalmanovich-Cohen et al., 2018). The escalation of commitment means the decision-maker seeks to 
continue with a project beyond a rational decision-maker would suggest otherwise. Committing to a greater 
extent than is justified by the situation's facts is not desirable for the organization. When decision-makers are 
under additional oversight, they are more likely to behave in the organization's interest and are less prone to 
overcommitment. One challenge in subjecting the loan officer to increased monitoring is that the loan officer 
may try to justify the loan problem resolution to a greater extent. Further, the loan officer relies on both hard 
information (e.g., financial ratios) and their interpretation of soft information. As such, those monitoring loan 
officer's justifications need to be aware of what constitutes hard information that can be verified versus soft 
information that is difficult to quantify, verify, and communicate (Berger and Udell, 2002). While the suggested 
solution has a shortcoming, managers' increased scrutiny in resolving violations lessens overcommitment.  
 
Compensation incentives can also be aligned to improve loan outcomes. Loan officers are often rewarded 
with generous incentives for the volume of loans created, often equivalent to greater than 25% of their salary 
(Berg et al., 2020). Since bonuses are usually tied to successful loan origination, loan officers have an 
incentive to approve higher-risk loans by overlooking many of their negative characteristics. Berg et al. (2020) 
noted that this often manifests as loan approvals for marginal loans. Loan officers are also compensated 
based on performance reviews, which relate to their ability to engage in loan prospecting, screening, and 
monitoring (Behr et al., 2020). This structure encourages loan officers to overlook or understate negative 
characteristics about their loan portfolios, compounding financial institutions' difficulty in evaluating aggregate 
risk. Aligning the incentives of the loan officer with the financial institution's long-term viability is one solution. 
Offering more generous pension and salary-based compensation aligns the interests of the loan officer to 
those of the bank's bondholders, who are ultimately concerned with the continued economic viability of the 
bank over short-term financial gains (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans 
and Liu, 2010; Eisdorfer et al., 2015). Loan officers should also have internal incentives that align their 
interests with credit officers, whose responsibility lies with evaluating and maintaining a portfolio of successful 
credits. 
  
Another solution suggested in the literature is to change the decision-maker (i.e., rotate assignments) 
(McNamara et al., 2002). This solution is limited in the commercial lending setting as it may be challenging 
to implement. Assigning the commercial loan to another officer can bring new problems since the loan officer 
is in charge of and is typically compensated for getting new relationships and maintaining existing ones. A 
similar solution is to require an independent third party from a different institution to assess the loan violation. 
While privacy concerns and the potential of losing the customer to the competition also apply, there are 
similar situations that subject the loan officer to a third party. For instance, the loan officer's work (with certain 
limitations) is overseen by other loan officers and underwriters in syndicated loans (i.e., loans funded by 
different institutions). Another example is the case of Small Business Administration loans in the United 
States, where these loans are further, to some extent, reviewed by government agencies. Banks can form 
groups and check each other's loans while maintaining sensitive information confidential. At least, lenders 
can implement this solution within subsidiary commercial banks within the same bank holding company. As 





Loan officers often face situations that allow them to revise a course of action. Borrower covenant violations 
enable the lender to modify the loan to protect from higher credit risk. While the loan officer relies on objective 
facts, including borrower financial data and market conditions, behavioral biases may cloud the risk 
assessment. In this paper, we discussed how the escalation of commitment could manifest in resolving 
financial covenant violations. Loan officers can depart from rational decision-making and provide resources 
to a borrower despite contradictory evidence to support the loan officer's initial decision.  
 
Understanding how behavioral biases affect the resolution of loan problems is complex, and further work is 
needed to understand this mechanism. This study focuses on the discussion of one determinant that affects 
the likelihood of covenant waivers. We acknowledge that additional work is necessary to understand how 
biases impair the resolution of covenant violations comprehensively. As such, we provide guidelines for future 
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research. Further work may include an empirical examination to evaluate the magnitudes of this bias. Future 
research should address the extent to which this bias is unconscious and how loan officers can minimize this 
bias. Compensation schemes in commercial banking can also affect how loan officers resolve violations. 
While commercial banks typically compensate loan officers for the volume and quality of their loan portfolios, 
further studies should examine whether paying loan officers for recognizing risks on a timely basis is 
beneficial for the bank in the long run. Further, while we focus on one particular determinant, future work can 
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